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DEcisioNs oF STATE COURTS AS RULES OF DECISION FOR FEDERAL
COURTS ON CoMMoN LAw QUESTIONS'
In a case governed by the common law of a state should the fed-
eral courts follow the decisions of the highest court of that state
finding the applicable principle of the common law? The United
States Supreme Court has recently answered that question in the
negative in a case in which it found the question involved to be one
of "general law."2  The other half of the usual rule is that the
federal courts will follow state court decisions on matters of "local
law" in cases governed by the common law of the state.8
Congress early enacted a statute making the laws of the several
states rules of decision for the federal courts in trials at common
law, where they apply, save where a federal question is involved.4
The Supreme Court does not consider decisions of the state courts
in common law cases "laws" within the meaning of the act.6 As
suggested, the federal courts feel bound by them on matters they
deem to be questions of "local law" but not on questions of "general
law."6
but suggests that even so it was inappropriate in this particular case since
defendant had actually not relied on any such defense. This objection, how-
ever, would be more forceful if defendant had by his evidence controverted
the evidence that he was in the possession of the liquor. Bird v. State, 257
Pac. 2 (Wyo., 1927). In the instant case, however, it is only the theory that
the State's evidence raised some possibility of doubt as to "home consumption"
that prevents the judge from charging the jury that if they believe the evi-
dence of possession the defendant is guilty. The charge actually given putting
the burden on defendant is much milder, and if the defendant is not entitled
to it, certainly he is not harmed by it.
This note is concerned only with the common law of the states. Sug-
gestive comment is made on the statutory aspect of the problem in a note in
5 Tex. L. Rev. 191.
'Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab
and Transfer Co., 48 Sup. St. 404 (1928). The case involved the validity of a
contract between one cab company incorporated in Tennessee and a railroad
company incorporated in Kentucky whereby for a money consideration the
R. R. Co. granted the cab company the exclusive privileges of going on its
premises and trains and in its depots to solicit business. The Kentucky court
had uniformly held such contracts invalid as monopolistic. The U. S. Supreme
Court held that the question was one of general law and sustained the lower
federal court in relying upon its independent judgment to uphold the contract.
'Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Ry. Co., 175 U. S. 91 (1899).
'28 U. S. C. A., §725 (1926). This statute was first enacted in 1789. As
appears from its terms it does not apply to proceedings in equity, admiralty,
federal criminal courts, or to any case involving federdl questions. Bucher
v. Cheshire R. R. Co., 125 U. S. 555, 582 (1888).
'R. R. Co. v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 14 (1880).
'Cab Co. v. Cab Co., supra, note 2.
NOTES
The federal rule is illustrated in numerous cases that only make
it the more questionable. In the well-known case of Swift v. Tyson,
Justice Story declared that a question concerning commercial paper
was one of general law, which the court would determine independ-
ently of state decisions.7 The federal courts have treated as ques-
tions of "general law" the validity of a carrier's stipulation against
negligence,8 the liability of a telegraph company to the addressee
for failure to deliver either an interstate9 or an intrastate' o tele-
gram, the question of priority as between assignees of a debt," the
construction of a policy of fire insurance,' 2 the validity of the fel-
low-servant rule's and the application of same,14 the attractive
nuisance doctrine as illustrated in the turntable cases,15 and the ileg-
ality of certain contracts as against public policy such as a contract
in restraint of marriage. 16 On the other hand, the federal courts
follow the decisions of the state courts settling rules of real prop-
erty17 such as those referring to riparian rights ;18 likewise in ques-
tions relating to title to personalty.19 Whether a lease of land by a
railroad company providing that the lessor would not be liable for
damage to the lessee's property on the premises caused by fire from
16 Peters 1 (1842). The question raised was whether an antecedent debt
constituted value for purposes of making one a holder in due course.8Lake Shore, etc. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101 (1893); R. P. Co. v.
Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357 (1873).
'Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Burris, 179 Fed. 92 (C. C. A. 8th, 1910).
.' Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Wood, 57 Fed. 471 (C. C. A. 5th, 1893).
The court deemed the question of damages for mental anguish one of general
law. Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance Co., 264 U. S. 182, 44 Sup.
Ct. 266, 31 A. L. R 867 (1924).
' Carpenter v. The Providence Washington Ins. Co., 16 Peters 495 (1842);
Hawkeye Commercial Men's Ass'n. v. Christy, 294 Fed. 208 (C. C. A. 8th,
1923), 40 A. L. R. 46.
" Beutler v. Grand Trunk Ry., 224 U. S. 85 (1912).
"'Baltimore and Ohio R. R. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368 (1893).
Snare and Triest Co. v. Friedman, 169 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1909).
Sheppy v. Stevens, 177 Fed. 484 (C. C. N. D. N. Y., 1910). This court
said: "In the federal courts the question whether a contract is contrary to
public policy and void is one of general law, and not dependent upon any
local statute or usage, and in determining such question the federal courts will
exercise their own judgment."
" Jackson v. Chew, 12 Wheat. 153 (1827). This case involved the effect of
devises in a will which provided for a devise over in case of failure of issue.
On the other hand, it has just been held the question of what user the
owner of the fee or his lessee may exercise over the right of way of an inter-
state railroad is one of "general jurisprudence." Midland Valley R. Co. v.
Sutter, 28 F. (2d) 163 (C. C. A. 8th., 1928).
'Kaukauna Water Power Co. v. Canal Co., 142 U. S. 254 (1891).
Etheridge v. Sperry, 139 U. S. 266 (1891).
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the lessor's locomotives is against public policy has been termed a
question of local law.20 Common law questions not pertaining to
rules of property have been treated in the large as questions of gen-
eral law in deciding which the federal courts do not feel bound to
follow state court decisions.
The distinction so often drawn between so-called "local" and
"'general law" is not a happy one. Justice Holmes' dissenting opin-
ion in the case which suggested this note indicated the fallacious
basis of the distinction.2 1 True, some state law deals with relations
that are of general interest throughout the nation and likewise other
state law deals with purely local matters. But insofar as the law
of the state itself is concerned as law it is either the local law of
that state or not law at all. There is no such thing as "general law"
in the sense of a general law in all the states over and above the
statutory and common law of a given state. The general principles
of the commercial law, for example, are not the law of a state simply
because their uniform recognition is made desirable by the universal
interest in their subject matter. It remains for the state to adopt
them into its law if it sees fit.
The Supreme Court of the United States has conceded that there
is no common law of the United States existing separate and apart
from the law of the states in the same way that federal statutes do.22
If the highest court of a state has declared what the common law of
that state is upon a given question, where else can the federal courts
properly look for the common law of that state but in the state
court's decisions? So far as that state is concerned the law is set-
tied. That courts legislate is clear enough.23 In cases governed by
the common law of a state should the federal courts recognize and
apply that law or follow a policy of laying down what they would
have it to be or what they think it should be ?24
"Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Ry., supra note 3.
Supra note 2.
"Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Call Pub. Co., 181 U. S. 92 (1901).
Gray, NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (2nd ed., 1921), p. 121; Cardoza,
TBE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1922), p. 115 et seq. And see the dis-
senting opinion of Holmes, J., in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349,
370 (1909). For a famous case involving judicial law-making see Fletcher v.
Rylands, L. 1L, 3 H. L. 330 (1868).
" The federal statute, supra note 4, does not conclude this question because
the federal court in the case suggested is supposedly applying the common law"
of the state just as it would be called on to apply a federal statute to a
situation controlled by the same.
NOTES
In the case first above cited25 the law of Kentucky, in which
state the contract in question was made, had been settled by judicial
decision since 1892.26 Under those decisions the contract in question
would have fallen as monopolistic. Thus the public policy of Ken-
tucky was involved, the merits of which do not concern us here.
The federal court chose to find what the law and public policy of
Kentucky ought to be rather than the law of the case. It happened
(due to the work of some lawyer familiar with the federal rule, no
doubt) that one of the contracting parties was a foreign corpora-
tion.2 7 If it had been a local one and the case had arisen in Ken-
tucky the ruling would doubtless have been the reverse of that
actually made. The case leaves Kentucky with two conflicting rules
of decision with reference to the same transaction. It certainly
does not strike one as a case involving the independence of the fed-
eral judiciary versus subservience to the state courts, but rather as
one wherein the federal courts failed in their obligation to apply
state law as they find it. Whatever justification there may be in the
historical background of the law merchant for the federal rule as
applied to commercial paper, that very rule itself fails of application
in a case like the Kentucky one, which involves a question of local
interest only.
J. B. FORDEIAM.
MARSHALING ASSETS IN FAVOR OF JUDGMENT CREDITOR
Where one creditor has a lien on two properties in the hands of
the same debtor, and another creditor has a lien on only one of
them, the latter, in equity, may frequently force the former to pro-
ceed first against the singly charged estate,' provided the rights of
the double lienholder are not prejudiced thereby,2 and provided also
that the two properties so charged are more than sufficient to satisfy
25Cab Co. v. Cab Co., supra note 2.
McConnell v. Pedago, 92 Ky. 465, 18 S. W. 15 (1892) ; Palmer Transfer
Co. v. Anderson, 131 Ky. 217, 115 S. W. 182 (1909).
2' Cab. Co. v. Cab Co., supra note 2. The fortunate cab company was a
Tennessee corporation. One issue in the case was whether there was a genuine
diversity of citizenship since it appeared that the Tennessee cab company had
only recently changed its place of incorporation from Kentucky to Tennessee.
'Pope v. Harris, 94 N. C. 62 (1886) ; Harrington v. Furr, 172 N. C. 610,
90 S. E. 775 (1916) ; Trust Co. v. Godwin, 190 N. C. 512, 130 S. E. 323 (1925).
Leading case: Aldrich v. Cooper, 8 Ves. Jr. 382, 32 Reprints 402, 18 E. R. C.
198.
'Jones v. Zollicoffer, 9 N. C. 623, 11 Am. Dec. 795 (1823); Knight v.
Rountree, 99 N. C. 389, 6 S. E. 762 (1888).
